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We develop a quantitative theory of human capital investments in order to evaluate
the magnitude of cross-country dierences in total factor productivity (TFP) that
explains the variation in per-capita incomes across countries. We build a heterogeneous-
agent economy with cross-sectional variation in ability, schooling, and expenditures on
schooling quality. By embedding our analysis in a growth model with tradable and
non-tradable sectors, we model sectorial productivity dierences across countries, as
documented in Hsieh and Klenow (2007). The parameters governing human capital
production and random ability and taste processes are restricted by a set of cross-
sectional data moments such as variances and intergenerational correlations of earnings
and schooling, as well as slope coecient and R2 in a Mincer regression. Our main
nding is that human capital accumulation strongly amplies TFP dierences across
countries: To explain a 20-fold dierence in the output per worker the model requires
a 5-fold dierence in the TFP of the tradable sector, versus an 18-fold dierence if
human capital is xed across countries. Moreover, we nd that sectorial productivity
dierences play a prominent role in quantitative implications of the theory.
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One of the most important challenges faced by economists is to explain the large observed
dierences in per-capita income across countries. In this paper, we develop a quantitative
theory of human capital investments in order to evaluate the magnitude of cross-country
dierences in the total factor productivity (TFP) that explains the variation in per-capita
income across countries. Building a quantitative theory allows us to circumvent two major
problems faced by growth accounting exercises. First, to date, there are no reliable cross-
country measures of the quality of schooling across countries. If this quality is positively
associated with the level of economic development, the residual in growth accounting ex-
ercises overstates the cross-country dierences in TFP. A second problem arises due to the
(unobserved) covariance of TFP with measures of physical and human capital, which renders
output variance decomposition dicult.
Our approach consists of developing a theory of human capital investments   schooling
time and expenditures on schooling quality   that can be used to quantitatively assess the
sources of cross-country income dierences. It is well known that the quantitative implica-
tions of human capital theory hinge crucially on the value of the elasticity of human capital
with respect to the expenditure on goods (see Trostel (1993) and Erosa and Koreshkova
(2007)). The intuition is simple: If schooling requires only time inputs, a change in the wage
rate aects equally the benets and the costs of human capital accumulation, leaving the
optimal level of human capital unchanged. On the other hand, when schooling requires only
input of goods, an increase in the wage rate raises benets but not the costs of schooling,
hence increasing the optimal human capital stock. Therefore, the relative importance of time
versus goods input determines the responsiveness of human capital to dierences in the wage
rate or TFP.1 Developing a quantitative theory, in turn, is a challenging task due to the lack
1Bils and Klenow (2000) point out that the production of human capital is more intensive in time input
than the production of output goods. They and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) argue that, by using a
one-sector growth model, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) overstate the importance of goods input in the
production of human capital and, thus, obtain results that understate TFP dierences across countries.
1of conclusive micro evidence on the expenditure elasticity of human capital: Some key hu-
man capital determinants, such as individual ability and private expenditures on education
(including those outside of formal schooling), are not observed. We address this problem by
building a theory of heterogeneous agents   in terms of ability, schooling tastes, and parental
resources   where the parameters governing human capital accumulation have important
implications for schooling and earnings inequality and intergenerational mobility within a
country. Because the model generates a set of cross-sectional statistics, such as variances and
intergenerational correlations of earnings and schooling, as well as slope coecient and R2
in a Mincer regression, that can be compared to actual data, we can use the restrictions of
the theory and U.S. household data to pin down the key parameters   elasticities of human
capital with respect to time and goods inputs   driving the quantitative implications of the
theory. We then use the theory to study income inequality across countries and, in partic-
ular, to quantitatively assess how variations in TFP are amplied through human capital
accumulation into larger dierences in output per worker across countries.
Our analysis builds on a multi-sector growth model that allows for sectorial productivity
dierences across countries, as documented in Hsieh and Klenow (2007) and Herrendorf and
Akos (2007). The cross-country experiments assume that, relative to the calibrated model
economy, a one-percent reduction in the productivity of the manufacturing (tradable) sector
is associated with an "-percent reduction in the productivity of the service (nontradable)
sector. When " is set to 1, sectorial productivities vary uniformly, and there are no dier-
ences in the relative prices across countries (apart from the wage rate). When " < 1, poor
countries exhibit a low productivity in all sectors, but their productivity in services relative
to manufacturing is high. Hence, relative prices vary across countries, with services being
cheap in poor economies. Our baseline experiments minimize the role of human capital in
amplifying income dierences across countries by assuming that human capital investments
only require services. When poor countries have a comparative advantage in the production
of human capital inputs (" < 1), their low aggregate productivity is not too detrimental
2to human capital accumulation. Nonetheless, our main nding is that human capital accu-
mulation strongly amplies TFP dierences across countries: The elasticity of output per
worker   at PPP prices   with respect to TFP in the tradable sector is 1:94. This implies
that a 5-fold dierence in TFP explains a 20-fold dierence in the output per worker, ob-
served between the top 10 percent and bottom 10 percent of countries in the world income
distribution. In contrast, without human capital accumulation, an 18-fold dierence in the
TFP of the tradable sector is required to account for the income dierence between rich and
poor countries.
The mechanism generating the large income disparity in our model economy is that a low
TFP in poor countries leads individuals to invest few resources in accumulating both physical
and human capital relative to individuals in rich countries. Human capital is an important
source of income dierences across countries, not only because it directly contributes to
cross-country output dierences, but also because a higher human capital stock stimulates
physical capital accumulation by raising the marginal product of capital.
At the theoretical level, it is interesting to answer the following question: How does a one-
percent change in TFP in all sectors in the economy aect output per worker? The answer is
provided by the one-sector version of the model economy (" = 1), and it is startling: The TFP
elasticity of output increases to 2:8. In a world where TFP varies uniformly across sectors,
the TFP ratio needed to generate a PPP-income ratio of a factor of 20 would be only 2:9,
which is about two thirds of what is implied by the model parameterization consistent with
productivity estimates in the data (" 2 [:3;:4]). Nevertheless, from a development accounting
view, the relevant amplication eect is the one estimated with the two-sector model as the
evidence suggests that TFP does not vary uniformly across sectors. We emphasize that the
amplication role of human capital is large even for implausibly low values of ": When " = :1
the TFP elasticity of PPP output is 1:53 in the model with human capital accumulation
and :86 in the economy with exogenous human capital. This dierential in TFP elasticities
across model economies is not minor: To generate an income ratio of 20, the economy with
3endogenous human capital requires a 7-fold dierence in the TFP of the tradable sector
while the economy with exogenous human capital requires a 33-fold dierence. We conclude
that it is important to model both human capital and sectorial productivity dierences for
assessing the cross-country variation in productivity.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes in detail the economic environ-
ment. In section 3, we consider a simple version of the model in order to illustrate the main
features of our theory driving human capital investments and to motivate our calibration
strategy. Section 4 lays out the calibration strategy for the benchmark economy and shows
that the model economy is consistent with several dimensions of heterogeneity in the data
that were not targeted in the calibration. Furthermore, the predictions of the benchmark
economy are tested using results from the micro literature on the enrollment eects of college
tuition changes. In section 5, we evaluate the aggregate impact of TFP dierences across
countries, perform a sensitivity analysis, and examine the predictions of the theory for the
variation in relative prices across countries. Finally, we compare our ndings to related
papers in the literature. Section 6 concludes.
2 Economic Environment
We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations of people who are altruistic
toward their descendants. People are heterogeneous in skills and physical assets and face
idiosyncratic (uninsurable) uncertainty about their labor earnings. Investments in human
capital involve children's time and expenditures by parents that aect the quality of the
human capital of their children. Parents cannot borrow to nance investment in human
capital. Since the analysis in this paper focuses on steady states, time subscripts are omitted
in the description of the model and use a prime to indicate the next period value of a given
variable.
4Demographic Structure There is a large number of dynasties (mass one). Individuals
live for three periods, so that the model period is set to 20 years. An individual is referred
to as a child in the rst period of his life (real age 6-26 years), a young parent in the second
period (real age 26-46 years), and an old parent in the third period of his life (real age 46-66
years).2 A household is composed of 3 people: old parent, young parent, and a child.
Production Technologies We assume that production takes place in two sectors   man-











where YM and YS denote the output of the manufacturing and service sectors; Ki and Hi
represent the services of physical and human capital used in sector i 2 fM;Sg. Parameter
 2 (0;1) is the elasticity of output with respect to physical capital and is assumed to be
equal across sectors. Parameter Ai, i 2 fM;Sg, represents a sectorial TFP, which is allowed
to vary across sectors.
Manufacturing output can be consumed (CM), invested in physical capital (X), and
invested in human capital (EM). Services can be either consumed (CS) or invested in human
capital (ES). Feasibility requires
CM + X + EM = YM;
CS + ES = YS:
2In an earlier version of the paper, we modeled a retirement period. Since it did not aect the quantitative
implications of the theory, we decided to abstract from retirement in the current version of the paper.
5Physical capital is accumulated according to
K
0 = (1   )K + X;
where investment goods X are produced in the manufacturing sector.
We model human capital investments that take place `early' in the life of an individual
and that include schooling as well as investments outside of formal schooling. Consistent with
the view of Kendrick (1976), Becker and Tomes (1986), Haveman and Wolfe (1995), Neal
and Johnson (1996), Mulligan (1997), Keane and Wolpin (1997, 2001), among many others,
we think that households invest a lot of resources in their children outside of school (health,
food, shelter, books, recreational activities and extracurricular educational activities). This
view motivates our focus on a broad notion of human capital investments. The human
capital of a child is produced with the inputs of schooling time (s 2 [0;1]) and expenditures
in human capital quality (e > 0) according to the following production function:




1  ; 2 [0;1]; (3)
A unit of schooling time (quantity of schooling) is produced with one unit of a child's time
and  l units of market human capital services. In other words, schooling requires own time and
human capital purchased in the market.3 Educational expenditures in quality are assumed





S ;  2 [0;1]:
To model heterogeneity across individuals, we follow the micro literature in allowing
individuals to dier in terms of their ability z and their taste for schooling . We assume
that the shocks to z and  are idiosyncratic to each dynasty and that they are observed
3Schooling s is a Leontief function of own time t and market human capital services hs: s = minft; hs
l g.
6at the beginning of the period, that is, before human capital investments take place. The
ability z is transmitted across generations according to a discrete Markov transition matrix
Q(z;z0), where qi;j = Pr(z0 = zijz = zj). The taste shock  is iid across individuals and,
possibly, correlated with the current realization of the ability shock z: The distribution of
the taste shock is thus described by a discrete matrix Q(z;).
The parameter AH in the human capital production function (3) is common across
all individuals in the economy and is normalized to 1 in our baseline economy. Later, in
some quantitative experiments, we consider cross-country variation in the eciency of the
human capital technology by allowing the parameter AH to vary across economies (Klenow
and Rodriguez-Clare (2001) allow for the possibility that countries dier in the productivity
of the education sector).







where CM represents consumption of manufacturing goods and CS consumption of services.
The term v(s;) represents utility of schooling, where  is a taste shock that varies across
individuals. Thus, consistent with the micro literature on schooling (see, for instance, Keane
and Wolpin (2001) and Card (2001)), in our model heterogeneity in schooling decisions is
driven by variation not only in parental wealth and labor market returns (ability) but also
in schooling tastes.
Market Structure and Relative Prices We assume competitive markets for factor
inputs and outputs. Firms in the manufacturing and service sectors maximize
M = YM   wHM   (r + )KM; (4)
S = PSYS   wHS   (r + )KS; (5)
7where we have set the price of manufacturing goods to 1 (numeraire). Prot maximization





The division of a total expenditure E between eM and eS to produce the composite input






s:t: pSeS + eM = E:
The optimal choices are eM(E) = E; eS(E) = (1   ) E
pS;e(E) = (1   )1 (pS)1  E:
Setting b   1
(1 )1  and
pe  b  (pS)
1 ; (7)
expenditures in education satisfy E =
(pS)1 
(1 )1 e = pe e: Note that the price of the composite
education input e increases with the relative price of services.
Similarly, the optimal allocation of total expenditure C between consumption of manu-






s:t: pSCS + CM = C:














Public Education Since our calibration strategy is to use cross-sectional heterogeneity
within a country to restrict the parameters governing human capital accumulation, we cannot
abstract from the role of public education on education and labor market outcomes. We
8model public education by assuming that education expenditures are subsidized at the rate
p per unit of schooling time. These expenditures are nanced with a proportional tax
 on households' income. Public and private expenditures are perfect substitutes in the
production of human capital.
Decision Problem of the Household All decisions of the household are made by the
young parent. The state of a young parent is given by a quadruple (q;hp;z;): resources of
the old parent q, human capital of the young parent hp, child's ability z, and child's taste
for schooling . Households face uncertainty over the realization in future periods of ability,
school taste and market luck, hence, they maximize the expected discounted lifetime utility
of all generations in the dynasty. Young parents choose consumption c, assets a0, time spent
in school by their children s (where 1 s is the working time of the children), and resources
spent on the quality of education of their children e. A parent who provides his child with s
years of schooling and a quality of education e incurs expenditures Pe e + (w l   p)s; where
w l is the cost of market human capital services per year of education, and p denotes public
education expenditures (or subsidies) per year of education.
The decision problem of a young household can be written using the dynamic program-
ming language as follows:
V (q;hp;z;) = max
c;e;s;h0;a
(
















Pc c + Pe e + (w l   p)s + a = (1   )w[ 2hp +  1hc(1   s)] + q;






0 = (1   )[w 3hp + ra] + a
a  0; s 2 [0;1];
9where ( 1;  2;  3) are life-cycle productivity parameters. The rst two terms in the objective
function are the current period period utility and the third term is the expected discounted
future utility. The expectations of the next period's value function is taken over the market
luck of the current child 0 and over the ability z0 and school taste 0 of the child born in the
next period. The rst constraint is the household budget constraint, where the right hand
side is given by the sum of the earnings of the young parent and the child upon nishing
school (1   )w[ 2hp +  1hc(1   s)]) and the resources q (after tax earnings and gross asset
return) brought to the current household by the old parent. The third constraint denes the
parental wealth q0 of the next household in the dynasty line.
We emphasize that when young parents make education decisions for their children, they
know the ability z and the taste for schooling . However, they face uncertainty regarding
the market luck of their children 0; which is realized in the adult stage of the individual's life
cycle. The human capital hc of an individual at the end of period 1 evolves stochastically,
according to a realization of a market luck shock 0: hp = 0hc; where 0 is iid across
individuals and time according to a density Q() with a mean equal to 1. We assume
that markets are imperfect in that households cannot perfectly insure against labor-market
risk and the human-capital shocks aecting their descendents. Moreover, individuals cannot
borrow.
There are many sources of heterogeneity in parental investment decisions for human
capital: First, children dier in ability z and taste for schooling . Second, parents dier in
their asset holdings and human capital. Parental resources play an important role because
incomplete markets, together with a taste for schooling, imply that human capital investment
decisions do not maximize expected lifetime income. Summing up, our baseline economy has
many factors inducing heterogeneity in schooling and earnings.
The theory abstracts from on-the-job human capital accumulation. This assumption is
motivated by tractability reasons as well as some empirical evidence across countries. Using
the coecients for returns to experience for each country reported in Bils and Klenow (2000),
10we found that the earnings of a worker with 20 years of experience relative to a worker with
10 years of experience is not systematically related to the level of per-capita income across
countries. In fact, we found a small negative correlation between returns to labor market
experience (wage growth) and per-capita income across countries, which suggests that on-
the-job investments in human capital are not likely to be an important source of income
dierences across countries.
3 Human Capital Investments in a Complete Markets
Environment
This section provides some analytical results that shed light on how the parameters of the
human capital technology determine the quantitative implications of the theory. To study
a simplied version of the model economy, we assume complete markets and abstract from
tastes for schooling. As a result, human capital investment decisions are independent of
consumption decisions and maximize lifetime income. We show that the quantitative impli-
cations of the theory for income inequality   within and across countries   depend crucially
on the expenditure elasticity of human capital. We also study how cross-country dier-
ences in sectorial productivities generate heterogeneity in relative prices and human capital
investments.
3.1 Human capital investments across individuals and countries
Consider a world with a large number of countries. Each country is populated by measure
1 of dynasties and by a vector of prices (w;pe) that varies across countries. Capital markets
are assumed to be perfect so that in equilibrium individuals make ecient investments in
human capital. The attention is conned to the steady-state analysis. The equilibrium
interest rate is given by the individuals' rate of time preference . Although the theory
11makes no predictions for the distribution of income, consumption, and wealth, it does have
important implications for the variation of schooling and earnings across individuals and
countries.
3.1.1 The decision problem
We analyze how variation in wages and variation in ability (z) lead to heterogeneous human
capital investments across countries (derive macro elasticities) and across individuals (derive
micro elasticities). The goal is to isolate the eects of the parameters of the human capital
technology on micro and macro elasticities in our model.
Consider the decision problem of an individual with ability z in a country with a wage
rate w and a price of education goods pe, where these prices are expressed in terms of the
manufactured good. The human capital investment decision can be formulated as choosing
schooling time (s) and expenditures (e) to maximize the present value of the lifetime earnings




w(1   s)h 1 + wh	   pe e   w ls
	
(9)








i 1 i with  i representing the life cycle productivity parameters described
in the previous section, and  = 1
1+r provided r = . The cost of schooling includes
expenditures in human capital quality (e), time-purchases on the market (tuition costs) per
unit of schooling time (w l), and foregone earnings in the rst period of life (swh 0).
Assuming an interior solution, the corresponding rst-order conditions are:
 wh 0 + whs [(1   s) 1 + 	] = w l; (11)
whe [(1   s) 1 + 	] = pe; (12)
12where hs = h
s and he = h
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We are ready to analyze how individual decisions depend on the parameters of the max-
imization problem. In the absence of tuition costs ( l = 0), it is easy to solve for s from
(13) and verify that the optimal quantity of schooling does not vary across individuals with
dierent values of z: Intuitively, when there are no tuition costs of schooling ( l = 0) a change
in z raises proportionally the benets and costs of schooling and has no eect on the optimal
choice of years of schooling. Moreover, when  l = 0, there is no variation in schooling across
countries (w;pe;AH): We thus maintain  l > 0. Similarly, in the absence of education expen-
ditures ( = 1), the quality of schooling does not vary across individuals and countries. On
the contrary, when 0 <  < 1, equations (13) and (14) imply that both quantity and quality
of schooling vary across individuals (z) and countries (w;pe;AH):
Proposition 1: The theory requires  l > 0 and 0 <  < 1 in order to generate dierences
in the quantity and quality of schooling across individuals (z;) and countries (w;pe;AH).
3.1.2 Micro-elasticities
Having characterized individual decisions, we can examine the eects of the parameters of
the human capital technology on variation in schooling and earnings across individuals and
countries. To gain insights with simple algebra, it is convenient to set  1 = 0: Combining
(13) and (14), taking logs, and dierentiating with respect to lnz, gives an expression for

























where the last equality used (15). The elasticity of human capital with respect to the ability,





Taking stock of the above ndings, we note that the elasticities of schooling and human
capital with respect to ability are the same. The magnitude of this elasticity is determined
by the returns to scale in the human capital accumulation technology (parameter ). For a
given distribution of z in the population, the variations in both schooling and human capital
increase with the returns-to-scale parameter . Hence this parameter is important for the
predictions of the theory on the cross-sectional inequality in schooling and earnings.
3.1.3 Macro-elasticities
Combining (13) and (14), taking logs, and dierentiating with respect to lnw, we obtain


























Since Ehw does not vary across individuals, the aggregation is trivial: If two coun-
tries dier in TFP by a ratio AR; then their ratio of aggregate human capital is: HR =
R
(WR)
EhA dGz = (WR)
EhA : We conclude EHw = Ehw =
(1 )
1  . Table 1 summarizes the
mapping from the model parameters into the micro and macro elasticities.
Table 1: Elasticities for the Deterministic Model
Macro










pe = Ex;w for x 2 fs;e;hg
Ex;AH = Ex;z
Micro
Esz = Ehz = Eez
1
1 
We are now ready to explore the sensitivity of the wage elasticity of human capital to
the parameters of the human capital technology. Since Ehw increases with the returns-to-
scale parameter  and decreases with the time share parameter , Ehw increases with the
expenditure elasticity of human capital and is maximized when  = 0 and  = 1. As the
time-share parameter  decreases from 1 to 0, EHw takes values in the interval [0;

1 ].
For instance, when  = :9, EHw takes values between 0 and 9; depending on the time-share
parameter. In other words, a wage ratio of 3 can generate dierences in human capital per
worker anywhere from a factor of 0 to 20 thousand.4
4While Ehw is determined both by  and ; note that the expenditure elasticity alone provides a lower
bound to the amplication eect. This is because   0 implies (1   )  , which together with (19) and





. On the other hand, the parameter  implies an upper bound for
Ehw since Ehw varies from 0 to

1  for all feasible values of .
15Proposition 2: The amplication eect of human capital, given by (19), depends cru-
cially on the expenditure elasticity of human capital (1   ). In particular, if the expenditure
share is zero ( = 1), then human capital does not amplify TFP dierences across countries,
no matter how close  is to 1.
Countries might not only dier in wage rates but on the relative price of education-goods
(pe) and the eciency parameter in the human capital technology (AH). An inspection of
the individual's optimization conditions (13) and (14) implies that the elasticities of the





Note that human capital investment decisions are determined by the ratio of the wage rate
to the price of education goods. Moreover, an increase in the eciency of the human capital
accumulation technology is tantamount to a change in the distribution of z.
3.2 Amplication with cross-country variation in sectorial pro-
ductivities
We have shown that cross-country dierences in relative prices (w;pe) generate a cross-
country variation in human capital investments. The next step is to analyze how cross-
country dierences in sectorial productivities generate heterogeneity in prices across countries










M = 1 and " < 1: (20)
16This assumption implies that a 1 percent change in the TFP of the manufacturing sector is
associated with an "-percentage change in the TFP of the service. Note that the case " = 1
corresponds to the standard one-sector growth model with no variation in relative prices







so that  < 1 implies that services are cheaper, in terms of manufacturing goods, in poor
countries than in rich countries. The ndings in Hsieh and Klenow (2007) suggest that
" = 1=3 gives a reasonably good approximation of the cross-country data on relative prices.
We also assume that there are no cross-country dierences in the eciency of the human
capital technology: A
j
H = 1 for all j. This assumption will be relaxed in the next section.























































where cw = (1 )( 
R )

1  does not depend on j: The real wage rate, measured in terms of
manufacturing goods, increases with the TFP of the manufacturing sector.
17The price of the composite education input in terms of the TFP of the manufacturing
sector is obtained using (6), (7), and (20):
P
j







From  < 1 and  2 (0;1); it follows that the price of the composite education input




We are now ready to focus our attention on the price ratio wj
p
j
e ; which drives the variation



















  (1   ")(1   ):
In a one-sector growth model (" = 1), this elasticity is equal to 1
1 : When " < 1, the
cross-country variation in the relative price wj
p
j
e is lower than in the one sector growth model
(" = 1). This is quite intuitive: When " < 1, poor countries are very inecient in producing
manufacturing goods, but they are not so inecient in producing services. Services are
cheap in poor countries because these countries have a high TFP in this sector relative to
manufacturing. Since services are an input in a composite education good, the real wage
  expressed in terms of the composite education good   does not increase with per-capita
income across countries as much as in the one-sector growth model. It is also intuitive that
the elasticity Ew=pe; AM decreases both with " and . That is, the elasticity is lower the
higher the comparative advantage of poor countries is in producing education goods, and
the lower the share of manufacturing goods is in the composite input e.
18The amplier eect of TFP dierences in the manufacturing sector on human capital
dierences across countries is given by







  (1   ")(1   )

:
The fact that human capital production requires some services ( < 1) makes human capital
less sensitive to a reduction of TFP in the manufacturing sector.
In a similar manner, we obtain











EeAM = Ee;w=pe Ew=pe;AM
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  (1   ")(1   )

:
Proposition 3: Assume that countries dier in their relative productivities across sectors




M)" with " < 1). The amplication eect of human capital accumulation
is driven by the expenditure elasticity of human capital as in the one-sector growth model.
The quantitative response to a change in the TFP in the manufacturing sector diminishes
with the extent of a comparative advantage in producing services (a reduction in ") and with
the importance of services in the composite education goods input (a reduction in ).
194 Calibration
As discussed in the previous section, the aggregate implications of TFP dierences across
countries in our model hinge on the parameters determining human capital accumulation.
Our calibration strategy is to restrict these parameters using cross-sectional heterogeneity
of schooling and earnings in the data for the United States.
4.1 Parameters and Targets
We calibrate our benchmark economy (B.E.) to data for the United States. We normalize
the units in which output is measured so that AS = AM = 1: The calibration of the baseline
economy does not require taking an explicit stand on the shares of manufactured goods
in consumption expenditures () and in human capital expenditures (). In particular,
we calibrate a one-sector economy with no manufacturing sector ( =  = 0): It is easy
to show that for any xed  and  2 (0;1), the two-sector model economy delivers, after
an appropriate normalization of the distribution of ability and of the distribution of taste
for schooling, the same equilibrium statistics as the calibrated one-sector model economy.
Hence, without loss of generality, we proceed by calibrating a one-sector model economy.
The parameters  and  will have important consequences for the cross-country experiments
in the next section of the paper, and their values will be determined later.5
The mapping between model parameters and targeted data moments is multidimensional,
and we thus solve for parameter values jointly. The discussion of calibration is divided into
two parts: rst, we discuss parameters that relate to preferences, demographics, and the
production of goods, and second   parameters that relate to human capital accumulation.
A summary of parameter values and data targets is provided in Table 2.
5Letting c1 and e1 denote expenditures in consumption and human capital in a one-sector model, an
equivalent two-sector growth model can be constructed as follows: Dene the quantitity of consumption c2
and human capital (composite) input e2so that c1 = pcc2 and e1 = pee2; for pc = b  and pe = b : Then,
normalize the distribution of ability and the taste shock in the two-sector model as follows: z2 = z1(pe)(1 )"
and 2 = 1=(pc)1 : This insures that all the equilibrium statistics are identical across the one-sector and
two-sector model economies.
20Table 2: Parameters and Data Targets
Parameter Value Target U.S. B.E.
Consumption Preferences
CRRA  2 Empirical literature    
Discount factor 1=20 0:9646 Interest rate (%) 5 5
Goods/Services Technologies
Capital share  0.33 Capital income share 0.33 0.33
Annual depreciation  0.0745 Investment to output ratio 0:2 0:2
Human Capital Technology
Schooling cost  l 2.65 Educ. inst. salaries (% of GDP) 5 5
H.C. RTS  1.00 Variance of xed eects 0:67 0:67
H.C. time share  0.6 Correlation of schooling 0:46 0:48
Tastes for Schooling
Low L 0.00075 Mean years of schooling 12:6 12:6
High H 0.01285 R2 in Mincer regression 0:22 0:21
Ability-taste corr. control b 1.09 Mincer return 0:1 0:1
Ability std z 0:23 Variance of schooling 8:5 8:3
Ability correlation z 0.78 Correlation of earnings 0:5 0:49
Market luck std  0:375 Variance of earnings 0:36 0:38
Tax rate on income  0.044 Public Education (% of GDP) 3:9 3:9
Preferences, Demographics, and Production of Goods We set the relative-risk-
aversion parameter  to 2. There is no direct empirical counterpart for this parameter in the
empirical literature since our model period is 20 years, and there is an innite intertemporal
substitution of consumption within a period. However, we consider a value of  that is in the
range of values considered in quantitative studies with heterogeneous agents.6 The discount
factor  is set to target an annual interest rate of 5 percent, which is roughly the return on
capital in the U.S. economy as measured by the average return on non-nancial corporate
capital net of taxes in 1990-96 (Poterba (1997)). The capital-share parameter is set to 0:33,
consistent with the capital-income share in the U.S. economy from the National Income and
Products Accounts. The depreciation rate  is selected to match an investment-to-output
ratio of 20 percent as documented in the Economic Report of the President (2004).7
6See Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) for discussions of these estimates.
7A similar target is obtained using the average of the investment-to-output ratio in the PWT6.1 for the
period 1990 to 1996 (Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002)).
21Human Capital Accumulation Recall that the human capital technology is given by
hc = z (se1 )
, where s denotes schooling time and e denotes educational expenditures.
Thus, we need to specify two elasticity parameters,  and . Ability follows an AR(1) process
(in logs):
ln(z
0) = z ln(z) + z; z  N(0;
2
z):
In our computations, we approximate this stochastic process with a discrete rst-order
Markov chain that takes 7 possible values for ability z, using the procedure in Tauchen (1986)
to compute transition probabilities. The market luck  is iid according to ln()  N(0;2
),
approximated over 5 values similarly to z .
On the cost side, human capital accumulation is aected by the schooling cost  l and
the public education subsidy p. The latter is determined by the tax rate on income 
in equilibrium. On the preferences side, human capital investments depend on the tastes
for schooling. The functional form v(s;) specied for the utility of schooling allows for a
diminishing marginal utility from schooling and a bounded marginal utility from schooling
at zero level of schooling:
v(s;) =  [1   expf sg]
where  2 fL;Hg. To allow for tastes for schooling to be correlated with ability, we let
the probability of the high-taste shock to increase with ability: Prob(Hjln(z)) = minf0:5+
blnz;1g.8 Note that b > 0 implies that taste for schooling and ability are positively corre-
lated. Thus, three parameters need to be specied for the tastes of schooling: two values
for schooling tastes fL;Hg and parameter b, governing the correlation of the abilities and
schooling tastes.
To sum up, there are ten parameters determining human capital accumulation:
f;;z;z;; l;;L;H;bg.
These parameters are calibrated so that in equilibrium the model economy matches the
8Ability is drawn rst, then the schooling taste is determined.
22following ten targets from the U.S. data:
1. Intergenerational correlation of log-earnings of 0:5 (Mulligan (1997); see also excellent
surveys of the empirical literature on the intergenerational correlation of earnings by
Stokey (1998) and Solon (1999)).
2. Variance of log of permanent earnings of 0:36 (Mulligan (1997, 1999)).
3. Average years of schooling of 12.63, computed from CPS data for 1990.
4. Variance of schooling of 8.47, computed from CPS data for 1990.
5. Public education expenditures on all levels of education as a fraction of GDP of 3.9
percent from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (1999). In computing this
statistic in the data, we treat as public expenditures all state and federal expenditures.
We view local public expenditures as private because they are closely tied to property
values and, therefore, to the incomes of parents. (See Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) for
a discussion.)
6. A variance of individual xed eects accounts for 2
3 of the variance of log-earnings
(Zimmerman (1992)). In our model, xed eects are due to heterogeneity in parental
resources, abilities, and tastes for schooling. The rest of the variation in earnings is due
to market luck. Thus, the variance of xed eects relative to the variance of earnings




7. A Mincer return to schooling of 10 percent. Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2005)
report a Mincer return between 10 to 13 percent during the period 1980 to 1990.
Psacharopoulos (1994) and Banerjee and Duo (2005) estimate a Mincer return of 10
percent for the United States for the period 1990-95. All of these studies use data
on annual earnings. Since our theory is about lifetime inequality, we estimate Mincer
returns using NLSY to proxy lifetime earnings with 6-year averages of the earnings of
23males aged 30-45.9 We obtained Mincer returns in the range .09 to .11, depending on
the age group considered (see Table 3). In our model, we measure returns to education
by regressing individual log-wages, whp, on years of education, given by the model
period times s:
ln(whp;i) = b0 + b1 (20si) + ui;
where b1 gives the Mincer returns to schooling.
8. R2 in the Mincer regression of .22. We nd that the R2 tends to increase with the age-
group considered, taking values between 0.16 and 0.26 (Table 3). Because the average
value of R2 over the life cycle is about 0.22, we set this value as a calibration target.
Table 3: Mincer Regression Results, NLSY
Age Group Constant Mincer Return R2 Num. Obs.
30-35 5.68 0.08 0.16 1857
35-40 5.56 0.10 0.21 1307
40-45 5.38 0.12 0.26 427
9. Teacher and sta compensation share in GDP of 0.05. According to the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education, Digest of Education Statistics, 2007, (public and private) institu-
tional costs for all levels of education amounted to 7 percent of GDP in 1990-1995.
Seventy two percent of these expenditures were on teacher and sta compensation
(Education at a Glance, OECD, 2007). In the model, this expenditure corresponds to
the w ls cost of schooling aggregated across households.
10. Intergenerational correlation of schooling of 0.46 as obtained by regressing children's
years of schooling on parental education, where the latter is dened as the average
years of schooling among mothers and fathers (see Hertz, Jayasundera, Piraino, Selcuk,
Smith, and Verashchagina (2007)).
9Each 6-year age group includes all males who worked full time for at least 3 out of 6 years, with observed
wages and hours.
24The calibration solves a rather complicated multidimensional mapping. Nonetheless, it
is useful to discuss how model parameters aect some specic targets. Given mean years
of schooling, the cost of teachers  l, and the income tax rate  to nance public education
expenditures, are almost directly pinned down by the share of teacher and sta salaries on
GDP and by the share of public education expenditures on GDP (that is, the distribution
of schooling matters little). The variance of market luck 2
 is set to match the variance of
earnings. The parameter  { determining returns to scale in the human capital technology
{ targets the variance of individual xed eects. In our theory, the earnings of parents and
children are correlated in part due to dierences in parental resources (the poor invest less),
and in part due to an exogenous correlation of parental and children's abilities. Thus, the
correlation of ability z targets the intergenerational correlation of earnings.
Given the parameters just discussed, the ve remaining parameters { variance of ability
(z), mean and variance of schooling tastes (controlled by H and L), correlation of ability
and schooling taste (controlled by b), and the time share () { jointly determine the mean
and variance of schooling, the R2 and schooling coecient in a Mincer regression, and the
intergenerational correlation of schooling. The mean value for schooling taste 0:5(L + H)
can be targeted to mean years of schooling, as the utility of schooling increases the benets
of schooling time. However, this parameter has important consequences for other targets
as well. To develop this point, note that the return to schooling is aected by tastes and
ability, where the former determines the utility of schooling and the latter the labor market
returns to schooling. By making utility of schooling more prominent in schooling decisions,
an increase in the mean of schooling tastes reduces the explanatory power of schooling on
earnings. On the other hand, an increase in the variance of ability raises the importance of
labor market returns in schooling decisions, hence raising the R2 and the schooling coecient
in a Mincer regression. Moreover, while the targets for Mincer returns and for the R2 tend to
move together in response to parameter changes, the relative magnitudes of these responses
25depend on the parameter being changed.10 The variance of schooling increases with a rise
in the heterogeneity in the returns to schooling, which can be attained with an increase in
both the variance of schooling tastes and ability or with a decrease in the time share ().
Furthermore, these alternative ways of increasing the variance of schooling have dierent
implications for a Mincer regression: While the explanatory power of schooling in a Mincer
regression decreases with the time-share parameter, it increases with both the variance of
schooling tastes and ability (the former by increasing the R2 and the latter by increasing
the slope coecient). Moreover, it also increases with the parameter b { controlling the
correlation of schooling and ability { by making ability more important than taste shocks as a
source of schooling variance. Nonetheless, the parameter b has a distinctive eect: While the
intergenerational correlation of schooling increases with the parameter b, by making schooling
tastes correlated across generations in a dynasty, this target is unaected by the variance
of ability or decreases with the variance of schooling tastes. Altogether, in spite of the
high interdependence of the targeted moments, the parameters have distinctive quantitative
eects on those moments.
4.2 The Benchmark Economy
The benchmark economy matches all the calibration targets quite closely (see Table 2). Be-
low, we show that the model is also consistent with several dimensions of heterogeneity in the
data that were not targeted in the calibration: schooling distribution as well as some evidence
on the relationship between schooling attainment of the children and resources/background
of their parents. Finally, we use results in the micro literature on the enrollment eects of
college tuition changes to test the benchmark economy. We conclude that the model repre-
sents a good quantitative theory of a within-country heterogeneity in schooling and earnings
in the U.S. economy.
10For instance, changes in schooling tastes (mean and variance) tend to have a strong impact on the R2,
and changes in the standard deviation of ability tend to have a strong impact on the schooling coecient of
the Mincer regression.
26Schooling Distribution While the calibration only targeted the mean and the variance of
schooling, the model economy accounts surprisingly well for the distribution of schooling.11
Table 4 reports maximum attained school years by population percentiles obtained from CPS
1990 data and those generated by our model. The model slightly overpredicts educational
attainments at the bottom of the distribution and underpredicts them at the top of the
distribution.
Table 4: Schooling Distribution   Model vs. Data
Distribution of Schooling Years
Percentile 5 10 25 50 75 90 95
Data 8 9 12 12 14.1 16 18
Model 10 10.2 10.6 11.2 14.1 17.2 19.4
Data source: CPS 1990
Schooling and Parental Background Although the calibration targeted the intergen-
erational correlation of schooling, the benchmark economy is consistent with other statistics
relating parental background to ospring's schooling. According to the statistics reported in
Keane and Wolpin (2001), the probability that a child attains schooling less than or equal to
12 years conditional on his highest-educated parent having less than or equal to 12 years of
schooling is :71 in the data. This probability is :72 in the model. Similarly, the probability
that a child attains more than 12 years of schooling conditional on his highest-educated
parent having more than 12 years of schooling is :60 in the data. This probability is :67 in
the model economy.
In reviewing the literature on children's educational attainment, Haveman and Wolfe
(1995) report that the elasticity of children's educational attainments with respect to family
economic resources varies in the range of :02 to :20. In many of the studies cited in their
11We note, however, that time in school is a continuous variable in our model, making its comparison
with the data non-trivial. In particular, the distribution of schooling in the data has clear spikes at levels of
education where an educational degree is completed.
27survey, family income is recorded only in a single year and hence measures permanent income
with an error. Haveman and Wolfe (1995) argue that when income is measured over a long
period of time, the estimated impact of income is far greater. Our model economy produces
an elasticity of :16, which is well within the range of values in the empirical literature.
Expenditures on Education In a well-known study, Haveman and Wolfe (1995) esti-
mated the annual investment in children in the US economy in the year 1992. Their calcula-
tions distinguish the investments made by public institutions from those made by parents, as
well as between direct and indirect private costs. They report that direct non-institutional
private costs of education of children aged 0-18 accounted for 8 percent of GDP. Private and
public institutional costs for all levels of education add 7.5 percent of GDP (U.S. Census
Bureau). The total direct cost of education in the U.S. is thus 15.5 percent of GDP. In our
model, the calibration did not target the aggregate amount of expenditures in education.
Computed as the sum of (pee + w ls) over all students, the total cost of education accounts
for 14.3 percent of GDP, a value slightly below the estimate of Haveman and Wolfe (1995).
Experiment: Eects of Tuition on College Enrollment. There is a large literature
on enrollment eects of college tuition changes to which the predictions of the model can be
compared. This literature is surveied by Leslie and Brinkman (1987) and discussed by Keane
and Wolpin (2001). Typically, the college costs eects on enrollment are identied from time
series and cross-state variations in tuition rates and grant levels. To compare results across
studies, it has become standard to use the percentage change in the overall enrollment rate
of 18-24 year olds in response to a tuition increase of $100 per year, expressed in dollars for
the academic year 1982-1983. In a survey covering 25 empirical studies, Leslie and Brinkman
conclude that, for national studies including the full range of public and private institutions,
estimates of the eects of a $100 increase in 1982-83 dollars tend to tightly pack in the range
of a 1:8 to 2:4 percentage decline in the enrollment rate of 18-24 year olds.
To evaluate the response of college enrollment to a price change in the model economy,
28we simulate a one-period unanticipated increase in college tuition of $1000 in 1982-1983
dollars. This experiment is done in partial equilibrium so that factor prices are kept xed.
We nd that college attendance declines by 1.5% per 100 dollars increase in college tuition,
which is close to the consensus estimates in the empirical literature review by Leslie and
Brinkman and to the recent estimates in Keane and Wolpin (2001).12 In a schooling model
structurally estimated with NLSY data on white young males, the authors found a decline
in the college enrollment rate of 1.2 percent per $100 tuition increase in 1982-83 dollars.
Using estimates from Kane (1994), Keane and Wolpin report that a $1000 tuition increase
in 1982-1983 dollars leads to declines in the enrollment rate of 34.0, 20.0, 12.3 , and 3.0
percent, respectively, for white males whose parents are in the rst through fourth income
quartiles. In comparison, our model economy predicts declines of 23.6, 21.9, 18.0, and 9.8
percent for individuals with parents in the rst through fourth income quartiles. The model
is thus consistent with the evidence that tuition eects are much stronger among individuals
born in families with a low parental income, although tuition eects decline with parental
income more steeply in the data than in the model. Altogether, the model is consistent with
the micro evidence on the enrollment eects of college tuition changes.
5 Quantitative Results
This section uses the theory developed to quantitatively assess the consequences of TFP
dierences across countries. We assume that countries are identical in terms of preferences
and technologies but only dier in their level of TFP. We asked the following questions: What
cross-country dierences in TFP are required for the model economy in order to account for a
20-fold income ratio between rich and poor countries? Does human capital play an important
role in amplifying income dierences across countries?
12More precisely, we found that a $1000 increase in tuition raises the enrollment rate by 15%. Following
the literature, we divide by 10 to obtain the response to a change in tuition of 100 dollars. We obtained
quite similar results when we simulated an increase in tuition of 500 dollars. In this case, the decrease in
tuition was 7.3 percent which implies a decline of 1:45 percent in enrollment per $100 increase in tuition.
29In answering the above questions, it will prove important to consider seriously the nding
of Hsieh and Klenow (2007) that TFP does not vary uniformly across sectors between rich
and poor countries. The fact that poor countries are relatively more productive at producing
services than manufacturing implies that services are relatively cheap in poor countries. If
the production of human capital is intensive in services, then poor countries have a compar-
ative advantage in the production of human capital input. As a result, the low aggregate
productivity of poor countries might not be as detrimental to human capital accumulation
as one would conclude by ignoring the sectorial productivity dierences across countries.
5.1 The experiment
To assess the magnitude of the TFP dierences needed to account for the observed disparity
in per-capita income across countries, we rst need to take a stand on the values of three
key parameters (";;).The rst parameter, "; determines the elasticity of the TFP in the
service sector to a change of the TFP in the manufacturing sector. The other two parameters,
 and ; pin down the share of manufacturing goods in consumption and in educational
expenditures. Intuitively, " determines the importance of cross-country heterogeneity in
relative prices while  and  aect how the variation in relative prices impact on investment
decisions and output per worker across countries.
The quantitative experiments below assume that the data counterpart to the service and
manufacturing sectors in the model economy are the nontradable and tradable sectors in
the data analyzed by Hsieh and Klenow (2007). In a cross-country study, these authors nd
that a one-percent variation in the TFP of the tradable sector is associated with a :3-percent
variation in the TFP of the nontradable sector in 1996, and that this elasticity was about
:4 in 1985 (see Table 7 on page 581).13 We thus consider experiments with " = :3 and :4.
To evaluate the sensitivity of the results, we also consider a `low' and a `high' value for the
13Hsieh and Klenow report that the elasticity of TFP with respect to PPP-output is about one third lower
in the nontradable sector than in the tradable sector in the year 1996 (see Table 7 on page 581). This ratio
is .5 in 1980 and .4 in 1985.
30parameter " by setting " = :1 and " = 1:
The calibration of the benchmark economy normalized the units in which output is
measured in the manufacturing sector and in the service sector so that AS = AM = 1:
Because these two sectors have the same TFP in the benchmark economy, the parameters
 and    determining the share of manufacturing goods in consumption and in education
expenditures   do not aect equilibrium statistics. However, these parameters determine the
quantitative implications of the theory across countries when sectorial productivities decrease
unevenly relative to the benchmark economy. This observation should not be surprising:
Since poor countries are relatively more ecient in the production of services (nontradables)
than in the production of manufactured goods (tradables), cross-country income dierences
decrease with the importance of services in aggregate expenditures.
The discussion above implies that it is important to take a stand on the values assigned
to the parameters  and : In doing so, two issues need to be confronted: First, in the data
the share of services in aggregate consumption expenditures increases with per-capita income
across countries, suggesting that parameter  varies with the level of economic development.
Second, there is no direct evidence on the share of services in education expenditures so
that it is not obvious how to determine a value for  in the model economy. We proceed
by setting  = :27 in the Benchmark Economy so that this economy is consistent with
the share of services in consumption expenditures in the US.14 To match the variation in
the share of services in consumption expenditures across countries, the experiments below
assume that the parameter  varies with TFP in the manufacturing sector with constant
elasticity. For each of the values of " considered, we calibrate the value of this elasticity
so that the theory is consistent with the fact that the elasticity of the share of tradables
in consumption expenditures with PPP output is  0:13: The share of services in education
14Note that in the data the education services provided by private non-prot institutions and government
are included in the nal consumption of households at their cost (see the Handbook of the International
Comparison Programme). To be consistent, we dene total consumption in our model as the sum of household
consumption c and expenditures in education e. Hence, in the baseline economy the parameter  determining
the share of tradable in aggregate consumption is set so that
 c
c+e = 0:23 (author's estimate using PWT data),
which implies  > :23.
31expenditures e is assumed to be 100% ( is set to 0): Note that by assuming that all education
inputs are produced by the service sector, our results will minimize the role of human capital
accumulation in accounting for income dierences across countries. Section 5.5 analyzes the
sensitivity of the quantitative ndings in some key dimensions. In particular, we investigate
how the quantitative ndings change when a fraction of educational expenses are in the
form of tradable goods (such as pencils, paper, books, and computers), and when we allow
countries to dier in their eciency at producing human capital.
5.2 Measurement
To measure GDP at PPP prices, a set of `international prices' needs to be chosen in a manner
consistent with the methodology in the PWT. The set of `international prices' in the PWT is
constructed by averaging prices among all countries, according to the procedures established
by the International Comparison Program (ICP) of the United Nations. In order to calculate
the average price for a product across countries, each with its own currency, the prices in the
individual countries are converted into a common numeraire currency using PPP exchange




















irepresent the price and quantity of product i in country j. Each national
price is converted into a common numeraire currency by dividing by the country's PPP
exchange rate Ej, and then averaged across all countries. The resulting price Pi is a weighted
arithmetic average of the converted national price using the quantity shares as weights. Thus,
Pi is the total value of the world transactions for good i, expressed in terms of PPP exchange
rates, divided by the total quantity of the good.
Note that the set of international prices and the PPP exchange rates in the PWT are
jointly determined as the solution to a system of equations involving prices for all goods
32and PPP exchange rates for all countries. Solving such a system of equations in our model
economy is a very demanding task as it involves simulating a set of model economies. The
simulated model economies should mimic the world distribution of countries in terms of
their population sizes and income distribution. In this way, the distribution of quantities
transacted across countries for various commodities can be aggregated as in the PWT data.
To circumvent this dicult problem, researchers typically calibrate the baseline economy to
the US and set international prices equal to the prices in the baseline economy. This approach
is motivated by the fact that, because the PWT use aggregate quantities to aggregate country
prices, rich country prices are weighted more than poor-country prices (see the discussion in
Hsieh and Klenow). Below, we argue that this approach has some serious drawbacks when
applied to a model of schooling, such as the one in this paper.
As discussed in the Handbook of the ICP, there is very little basis for comparing education
prices across countries using tuition or fees because they usually do not cover full cost and are
not market-prices due to heavy government subsidies. It is thus not possible to use (26) to
determine an international schooling price that can be used to value schooling output across
countries. As a result, the ICP uses an \indirect approach" which involves using data on the
PPP prices of inputs to aggregate at international prices expenditures on education inputs.15
Since the salaries of teachers are a major schooling cost, the international salary for teachers
is a crucial determinant of schooling expenditures at international prices. However, the U.S.
wage badly approximates the real wage used in the PWT to value education costs across
countries. While for most products, such as cars and airline tickets, the US and similarly rich
economies account for most of the world transactions, this is not the case for schooling, for
two reasons. First, the variation in average years of schooling across rich and poor countries
is easily an order of magnitude smaller than the variation in the consumption of cars and
airline tickets. Second, poor countries account for the bulk of the world population of school-
aged individuals. Thus, (26) is likely to put a signicant mass on the salaries of teachers in
15The price of education is then obtained as the ratio of education expenditures at domestic prices to
expenditures at international prices.
33poor countries.16
The above discussion stresses a novel point: The choice of an international wage rate to
value teachers' services across countries in a schooling model is a delicate issue. Moreover, as
we have veried in our computational experiments, the results for output inequality across
countries critically depend on the choice made. To circumvent these diculties, we compute
GDP at international prices net of teacher output or, equivalently, we measure national
income net of the salary of teachers. The advantage of this approach is that we avoid taking
a stand on how to set the international real wage for teachers. Moreover, using data from
the PWT on institutional expenditures in education, we have made a similar adjustment to
the GDP data in the PWT by computing GDP at international prices net of institutional
expenditures. We have veried that all statistics of interest (such as the dispersion in income
per capita and the income elasticity of schooling) are not aected in a signicant manner by




j = YM + Ys;
where the price of services is set as in the baseline economy (p
s = pUS
s = 1): Later on, in a
sensitivity analysis, we evaluate how the results change when the US wage rate is used as
an international price to value teachers' services in GDP. We show that this procedure has
highly counterfactual implications.
16While it is obviously important to aggregate all international prices in the model economy in a manner
consistent with the PWT, this issue is of a rst-order importance when it comes to aggregating teachers'
wages. Because the cross-country variation in real wages is very large, incorrect weights can lead to an
international salary for teachers in the model economy that is grossly at odds with the PWT. To deal
with this problem, one approach would be to calibrate the model economy to replicate the world population
distribution across rich and poor economies and use (26) to jointly solve for the set of international prices and
countries' PPP exchange rates. This is a daunting task. Moreover, there is no guarantee that our simulations
can mimic the world distribution of years of schooling because our calibration only targets average years of
schooling in the baseline economy.
345.3 Amplication Eect
Unlike the results in Section 3, the amplication eect in the benchmark economy cannot
be characterized with an analytical expression. However, there is a simple way of measuring
the amplication eect of TFP in the calibrated model economy. For each value of ", we
simulate the model economy for dierent values of AM and run the following regression in
the simulated data
lnY = a1 + a2 lnAM + ui;
where Y denotes GDP. The values considered for AM are 1;:5;:25;:125:We run the regression
for GDP measured at domestic prices and PPP prices. The fact that the R2 in all the
regressions are close to 1 implies that the estimated regressions represent a good description
of how AM and Y covary in the simulated data. The coecient a2 can then safely be
interpreted as the elasticity of output with respect to AM:
Table 5: Amplication
" .1 .3 .4 1
Human Capital Model
TFP elasticity of GDP
PPP prices 1.53 1.94 2.08 2.8
Domestic prices 1.98 2.16 2.26 2.8
AM ratio for GDP, PPP, ratio of 20 7.1 4.7 4.0 2.9
TFP elasticity of Physical Capital 1.97 2.15 2.23 2.8
TFP elasticity of Human Capital 0.46 .63 .70 1.24
Exogenous Human Capital Model
TFP elasticity of GDP
PPP prices .856 1.046 1.12 1.49
Domestic prices 1.49 1.49 1.49 1.49
AM ratio for GDP, PPP, ratio of 20 33.1 17.5 14.5 7.5
TFP elasticity of Physical Capital 1.49 1.49 1.49 1.49
Table 5 reports the main results in the paper. The elasticity of GDP   at PPP prices  
with respect to AM is 1:94 when " is .3 and 2:08 when " is :4. To assess what the estimated
35elasticities imply for understanding the observed income dierences across countries, we
compute the TFP ratio in the manufacturing sector needed to generate a ratio of aggregate
income at PPP prices of 20. This ratio is roughly the PPP-income ratio between the 10%
richest countries to the 10% poorest countries in the world income distribution. The ratio
of TFP in tradables to explain a PPP-income ratio of a factor of 20 is 4:7 when " = :3
and 4:0 when " = :4: These ndings imply a substantial amplication of TFP dierences
across countries. The mechanism generating a large income disparity is that a low TFP
leads individuals in poor countries to invest few resources in accumulating both physical and
human capital relative to individuals in rich countries.
One way of assessing the amplication results in our paper is to compare them with
the ndings in Hsieh and Klenow (2007). These authors perform a development accounting
exercise using a growth model with no human capital accumulation and nd that a 1-
percent change in the TFP of the tradable sector leads to an increase in output per worker
of 1:04.17 To show that the much larger amplication in our theory is due to human capital
accumulation, we calibrate a version of the model economy with no investments in human
capital.18 When " = :3 and human capital is exogenous, the AM elasticity of output at PPP
prices is 1:05, which is quite close to the 1:04 estimated by Hsieh and Klenow. The ratio of
TFP in manufacturing to explain a PPP-income ratio of a factor of 20 is now 17:5, which is
much higher than the 4:7 ratio in the economy with investments in human capital.
Human capital is an important source of amplication of income dierences across coun-
tries for two reasons: First, human capital directly contributes to cross-country output dif-
ferences because poor countries accumulate less human capital than rich countries. Second,
a higher human capital stock stimulates more physical capital accumulation by raising the
marginal product of capital. As a result, human capital accumulation amplies the eects
of TFP dierences on physical capital: While the AM elasticity of physical capital is 2:15 in
17They report an elasticity of TFP in the tradable sector with respect to income per capita in 1996 of
.962, which implies a TFP elasticity of income of 1=:962 = 1:04:
18Labor productivity is xed at h = z s; where s is set at its average value in the benchmark economy.
36the economy with human capital accumulation, it is only 1:49 in the model with no human
capital investments (as documented in Table 5 for the economy with " = :3 ). Note that
the strength of these eects increases when sectorial productivity dierences across countries
are small (" is high). The TFP elasticities of human and physical capital rise with " as the
higher the value of this parameter the lower the comparative advantage of poor countries at
producing services (see Figure 1).
Given the role of human capital in amplifying income dierences, it is interesting that
poor countries in our model economy are characterized by a high ratio of human capital stocks
to PPP-output. The assumption that the human capital production technology does not vary
across countries implies that poor countries have a comparative advantage in accumulating
human capital relative to physical capital. The relative ineciency in producing physical
capital explains why these countries exhibit a low ratio of physical capital to output at PPP
prices, as emphasized by Hsieh and Klenow (2007). The quantitative importance of these
eects can be assessed by comparing the AM-elasticities of physical capital, output, and
human capital (see Table 5). When " = :3, we have that EKAM = 2:15; EY AM = 1:94;
and EHAM = :63: The ranking of elasticities (EKAM > EY AM > EHAM) implies that the
physical-capital-to-output ratio increases with TFP but that the human-capital-to-output
ratio decreases with TFP.
The results in Table 5 indicate that it is important to model sectorial productivity dier-
ences for assessing the role of human capital in amplifying income dierences. When " = 1,
the AM elasticity of PPP-output is about 1:31 points higher in the model with endogenous hu-
man capital than in the model with no human capital investments. This elasticity-dierential
decreases to 1:046 when " = :40 and to 0:89 when " = :3: As the TFP elasticity of PPP
output decreases with ", so does the amplication provided by human capital (see Figure 1,
bottom). When " is set at a low value, poor countries exhibit a high relative TFP in the
service sector, which, in turn, leads to a low price of services relative to rich countries. Since
services are a key input in the production of human capital, cheap services in poor countries
37operate as a force towards reducing income inequality. Nevertheless, the amplication role of
human capital is large even for implausibly low values of ": When " = :1 the TFP elasticity
of PPP output is 1:53 in the model with human capital accumulation and :86 in the economy
with exogenous human capital. This dierential in TFP elasticities across model economies
is not minor: To generate an income ratio of 20 the economy with endogenous human capital
requires an AM ratio of 7.1 while the economy with exogenous human capital requires an
AM ratio of 33.1 (see Table 5).
At the theoretical level, it is interesting to answer the following question: How does
a one-percent change in TFP in all sectors in the economy aect output per worker? The
answer is provided by the one-sector version of the model economy (" = 1), and it is startling:
The amplication eect is now 2:8. In a world were TFP varies uniformly across sectors,
the TFP ratio needed to generate a PPP-income ratio of a factor of 20 would be only 2:9,
which is about two thirds of what is implied by the two-sector model with " 2 [:3;:4].
Nevertheless, from a development accounting view, the relevant amplication eect is the
one estimated with the two-sector model as the evidence suggests that TFP does not vary
uniformly across sectors. We conclude that it is important to model both human capital and
sectorial productivity dierences for assessing the cross-country variation in productivity.
5.4 Discussion on Relative Prices and Human Capital
We have shown that human capital is an important source of amplication and that the TFP
elasticity of output depends critically on the parameter ": Since " determines the variation
in relative prices across countries, it is important to examine the implications of the theory
for relative prices and test them with the evidence from the Penn World Tables (Heston,
Summers, and Aten (2002), hereafter, PWT). Moreover, to address the concern that our
quantitative theory may be exaggerating the TFP elasticity of human capital investments,
we examine evidence on the variation in human capital investments across countries.
385.4.1 Theory and Evidence on Relative Price Variation
We can construct a proxy for the price of education inputs across countries using data on the
price of services from the PWT. This seems a reasonable proxy in the view that educational
inputs are mostly provided by the service industry. Figure 2 (top) plots cross-country data
on the price of services versus per-capita income from the PWT for the year 1996 as well
as the simulated model data. Note that the elasticity of the relative price of services with
respect to PPP output is :30 in the PWT data, which is quite close to the :29 value predicted
by the economy with " = :4 and to the :36 value obtained in the economy with " = :3: The
economies with " = 1 and " = :1 have counterfactual predictions for the variation in the
price of services across countries: The former implies no variation in relative prices across
countries while the latter grossly overpredicts the variation in the data (2, top). We conclude
that the evidence supports values of " within the range [:3;:4]; with the best t of the data
obtained when " is parameterized with values close to :4:
The PWT dene PPP exchange rates for education as education expenditures in national
currency divided by their real value in international dollars. The education PPP exchange
rates are computed with data on expenditures by educational institutions, for there are no
cross-country data on educational expenditures at the level of the household. Figure 2
(middle) plots the PWT data on the price of education, normalized by the PPP price of
GDP, and the PPP output per capita. For comparison, we plot model-simulated data on
the prices of two key schooling inputs normalized by the PPP price of GDP: the wage rate
and the price of services (nontradables) (Figure 2, middle and bottom). By focusing on
the prices of these two schooling inputs, we avoid taking a stand on how to aggregate and
value at international prices expenditures in our model economy (see the discussion in the
Measurement section).
Figure 2 (middle) documents that the price of institutional expenditures in education
tends to increase with income across countries albeit the relationship is not very strong.
While the income elasticity of the education price is :046, in our model economy the income
39elasticity of the real wage rate   in terms of PPP output   takes values above :60 when
" = :3 and :4: The one-sector economy (" = 1) exhibits the smallest elasticity, :53; which is
still well above the value in the data. Figure 2 (bottom) shows that the income elasticity
of the relative price of services   in terms of the PPP price of output   takes values of :25
and :21 when " = :3 and :4: Hence, the ndings suggest that in our simulations the price
of education inputs rises too fast with the level of economic development relative to the
data, suggesting that the quantitative results understate human capital dierences across
countries.
5.4.2 Theory and Evidence on Variation in Human Capital Investments
Next, we turn to the question: Are the cross-country dierences in human capital investments
implied by the theory plausible? For each value of ", we obtain observations for average years
of schooling and output per worker by simulating economies that vary in their relative levels
of TFP. In Figure 3 (top), we plot cross-country data on schooling and income, taken from
Cohen and Soto (2007) and Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002), together with the simulated
data from the model economy. The gure reveals that the income semi-elasticity of schooling
in the cross-country data is 2:56. All the simulated model economies generate a lower
schooling-income semielasticity than in the data. The highest value of the semielasticity,
1:86, is generated by the economy with " = 1. Given that our theory does not overstate
schooling dierences across countries, we then ask if the the cross-country dierences in the
quality of schooling across similar schooling levels are reasonable.
In an inuential paper, Hendricks (2002) measures cross-country dierences in schooling
quality using data on relative earnings (adjusted by schooling levels) of immigrants in the
United States. Table 6 provides summary statistics on the data analyzed by Hendricks. The
population of U.S. immigrants is divided into 4 groups according to the income-percentile of
the country of origin relative to the United States. The country groups considered are the
20th, 30th, 40th and 50th to 65th percentiles of the U.S. per-capita income. The average years
40of schooling among immigrants in these country groups are, respectively, 12:5;12:8;12:4; 14:3;
and the average earnings of these immigrants are 97%, 92%; 94% and 107% of the earnings
of similarly educated workers in the United States (see Figure 4). While Mexico and Puerto
Rico19 have a per-capita income of roughly 45% of the U.S. level, we did not include these
two countries in the 40th income percentile group because immigrants born in Mexico and
Puerto Rico have on average 7:4 years of schooling   a schooling level well below that of all
other immigrants in Hendricks' sample. Nevertheless, we examine the data for Mexico and
Puerto Rico separately in a fth country group.
Table 6: U.S. Immigrant Characteristics (computed from Hendricks (2002))
GDP, PPP, percentile 20   30% 30   40% 40   50% 50   65% MEX-PRT
Number of countries 11 10 7 5 2
Relative home GDP, PPP 24.4 33.3 44.8 58.5 45.75
Years of schooling 12.5 12.8 12.4 14.3 7.45
Relative earnings 0.97 0.92 0.94 1.07 0.93
We simulate immigrants from ve potential source countries diering with respect to their
TFP in order to generate comparable statistics from the model economy. Immigrants are
selected so that they have an average level of schooling consistent with the data reported in
Hendricks. We then compute the ratio of earnings between immigrants and equally schooled
workers in the Benchmark Economy and compare these results to Hendricks' data.
To proceed, we need to take a stand on how immigrants are selected from the popu-
lation in the source country. In our model economy, equally schooled individuals can be
heterogeneous in many characteristics (taste for schooling, ability, parental human capital,
and wealth) and, thus, in their earnings. As a result, selection into emigration from the
distribution of these characteristics has important consequences for their average earnings.
We now study in detail how dierent forms of selection by wealth aect the results. For each
19To simplify the terminology here, we slightly abuse the language and refer to Puerto Rico as a `country'
rather than an incorporated U.S. terrritory and call migrants from Puerto Rico in the U.S. `immigrants'
41source country, we compute the wealth distribution for individuals within a given school-
ing bracket, and we entertain two possibilities on how immigrants are selected from these
populations. First, as a benchmark, we assume that immigrants are randomly drawn from
the entire wealth distribution. Second, we examine selection into emigration based on the
household wealth and show that this type of selection successfully reconciles the relative
earnings of immigrants predicted by the model with those obtained from the data.20 Figure
4 presents results for economies with " = :3 and " = :4.
When immigrants are a random draw from the entire wealth distribution (100th percentile
on Figure 4), our model tends to overpredict the earnings gap between workers of the same
schooling level in rich and poor countries. While the earnings gap for immigrants born in
countries below the 50th percentile are about :80 in the model, it is above :90 in the data.
On the other hand, the model overpredicts the the relative earnings for immigrants born in
Mexico and Puerto Rico, producing a ratio of 1:04 relative to a :93 in the data. Moreover,
the model cannot account for the fact that immigrants from countries in the 50th percentile
earn about 7% more than americans, an observation suggesting that schooling quality is
higher in this group of countries than in the U.S.
We now show that the model can account well for these non-trivial patterns of the
immigrant earnings data, provided that selection of immigrants by wealth is allowed to
play a role. We assume that immigrants are a random draw from the bottom tail of the
wealth distribution in a given schooling bracket. Then, we right-censor this distribution at
dierent wealth percentiles and assume that immigrants are a random draw from the resulting
wealth distribution. Notice that selection is more important the more truncated the wealth
distribution is. The case of no selection corresponds to the assumption that immigrants
are drawn from the bottom 100% of the wealth distribution (e.g. no truncation). Figure 4
graphs, for " = 0:3 and " = 0:4; how average earnings vary as immigrants are increasingly
20Note that selection by wealth matters because wealth is correlated with ability and schooling expendi-
tures. Alternatively, we could directly select immigrants in terms of their ability and schooling expenditures
but this would not aect our main conclusion that selection can reconcile the predictions of the theory with
the data.
42drawn from more wealthy backgrounds. We nd that immigrants' human capital tends to
decline with parental wealth for the rst four country groups. On the other hand, earnings
increase with parental wealth in the fth country group representing Mexico and Puerto
Rico.
Why does the relationship between parental wealth and immigrants' human capital switch
signs across countries? The key is that while immigrants from the rst four country groups
have on average more than 12 years of schooling, immigrants in the country group repre-
senting Mexico and Puerto Rico have on average only about 7 years of schooling. As a
result, immigrants from the rst four country groups exhibit high average years of schooling
relative to their source-country population, and the opposite is true for the case of Mexico
and Puerto Rico. When immigrants are positively selected from the schooling distribution,
they tend to exhibit a relatively high taste for schooling. In this case, the rate of return
to schooling is a relatively less important determinant of schooling decisions. Moreover, the
importance of returns to education for schooling decisions diminishes with parental wealth:
Wealthy individuals tend to care more about the utility of schooling as they have a low
marginal utility of consumption. As a result, conditional on a level of schooling, individuals
with wealthy backgrounds tend to be of a relatively low ability and to spend little on ed-
ucation. This accounts for the negative relationship between earnings and parental wealth
among highly-schooled immigrants. Our ndings point that the case of Mexico and Puerto
Rico is quite dierent. Immigrants from these countries are relatively low-schooled and care
little about the utility of schooling. The rate of return to schooling is the main driving force
behind their schooling decisions. A more favourable parental background is associated with
more human capital expenditures and, hence, higher human capital.
Figure 4 (top) indicates with a dot, for each country group, the amount of selection needed
to account for the immigrants' earnings data for the economy with " = :3. The earnings
data for the rst three country groups can be rationalized if immigrants are drawn from the
bottom 20th, 30th, and 50th percent of the wealth distribution. Moreover, assuming that
43immigrants are drawn from the bottom 40 percent of the wealth distribution accounts for
the observed earnings ratio of 1.07 among immigrants born in countries in the 50th to 65th
percentile group. The average earnings ratio observed among immigrants born in Mexico
and Puerto Rico can be accounted for if immigrants from these countries were drawn from
the bottom 60% of the wealth distribution. Figure 4 (bottom) illustrates similar ndings for
the economy with " = :4: We conclude that the model can account well for Hendricks' data.
5.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We now assess the eects of TFP under dierent assumptions on the importance of traded
goods in education expenditures and on the cross-country dierences in the eciency in the
human capital production. Moreover, in light of the discussion in the Measurement Section,
we evaluate the sensitivity of the results to alternative ways of measuring TFP.
The cross-country experiments presented above assumed that all education inputs are
nontradable ( = 0) and that countries have the same eciency in producing human capital
(A
j
H = 1 for all j): To the extent that education requires some tradable inputs (such as
books, paper, pencils, computers), it is interesting to evaluate the sensitivity of the results
to allowing for some expenditures in tradable inputs. To this end, we consider an experiment
in which the share of traded goods in education inputs is set to :23 for all countries. This
value corresponds to the share of traded goods in consumption expenditures in the U.S.
(US = :23). Recall that the U.S. exhibits the lowest share of traded goods in consumption
expenditures, as in the data this share decreases with the level of per-capita income across
countries. We thus view the choice of  = :23 for all j as likely to be conservative.
To the extent that in the data poor countries tend to have low productivity in all sectors
of the economy, it seems reasonable to consider the possibility that poor countries also have
a low eciency in producing human capital. To this end, we consider an experiment in which
countries dier in their eciency in producing human capital (the share of tradable goods
in education expenditures is set to 0). Specically, countries are assumed to vary in their





S for all j).
We nd that modeling traded inputs in human capital production and modeling cross-
country dierences in the eciency of human capital production improves the predictions
of the theory for the cross-country variation in schooling (see Figure 3, bottom). In fact,
the latter formulation matches the schooling-income elasticity in the data quite closely. Am-
plication does not rise much in the rst experiment, but it increases substantially in the
second one. When countries dier in the eciency of human capital production, the AM
ratio that generates an output ratio of 20 drops to 3:3; which should be compared to the
4:7 ratio in the Baseline Economy. Despite dierences in the results across experiments,
we emphasize two consistent ndings. First, for all the specications of the human capital
technology considered, we nd that human capital plays a crucial role in amplifying income
dierences across countries. Second, accounting for the income dierences across countries
always requires substantial dierences in TFP.
Table 7: Sensitivity
Baseline(" = :3)  = :23 AH = AS
TFP elasticity of
GDP, PPP 1.94 2.05 2.49
Physical Capital 2.23 2.3 3.1
Human Capital .63 .76 1.22
for GDP, PPP, ratio of 20
TFP ratio 4.7 4.3 3.3
In Section 5.2, we have argued that it is quite dicult to take a stand on how to value
teacher services at international prices. These diculties led us to value GDP net of teacher
services in our computational experiments. We now evaluate how our results change if we
use the prices of our baseline economy (calibrated to the US) to value teacher services when
measuring GDP at international prices. Table 8 presents the results. When " = :3, using
45the U.S. wage rate to value teacher services across countries reduces amplication from 1:94
to 1:5: As a result, the TFP ratio in the Manufacturing sector needed to explain an output
ratio of 20 increases from 4:7 to 7:4: In assessing the relevance of these ndings, it is worth
making two observations. First, TFP amplication is substantially above the one obtained
in the exogenous human capital model as indicated by the fact that a TFP ratio of 17:5 is
needed to account for an output ratio of 20. Thus, our main nding   that human capital is
an important source of amplication of cross-country income dierences   stands regardless
of the method used to value teacher services. Second, when U.S. wages are used to value
the contribution of teacher services to GDP, the model economy has implications that are
grossly at odds with the data: It implies that the share of teacher salaries in GDP is about
65% of GDP in poor economies. However, among countries with a per-capita income of
1=20th of the U.S. level, teacher salaries account for 6:5% of GDP at PPP prices. That is,
the theory overstates this share by a factor of 10: We conclude that using U.S. wages to value
teacher services severely biases upwards the GDP of poor countries at international prices
and, hence, biases downward our estimates of TFP amplication.
Table 8: Robustness: using wUS to value teacher services
" .1 .3 .4 1
TFP elasticity of GDP, PPP
Baseline 1.53 1.94 2.08 2.8
w = wUS 1.26 1.50 1.66 2.29
Exogenous HC .856 1.046 1.12 1.49
AM ratio for GDP, PPP, ratio of 20
Baseline 7.1 4.7 4.0 2.9
w = wUS 10.8 7.4 6.1 3.7
Exogenous HC 33.1 17.5 14.5 7.5
465.6 Brief Literature Discussion
In a provocative paper, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) [hereafter MRW] argue that the
Solow growth model augmented to include human capital can account for most of the varia-
tion in output per capita across countries. However, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and
Bils and Klenow (2000) argue that MRW have overstated the importance of human capital
in accounting for cross-country income dierences by focusing on a one-sector model with no
distinction between the production of goods and human capital. To address these concerns,
our paper develops a theory of human capital investments based on a multi-sector hetero-
geneous agent model, calibrates it to micro data on schooling and earnings, and uses the
theory to quantitatively assess the sources of cross-country income dierences. In a similar
pursuit, but using a dierent approach, Manuelli and Seshadri (2005) [MS hereafter] build a
representative-agent model with life-cycle human capital accumulation. They abstract from
sectorial heterogeneity in TFPs and calibrate the human capital technology to the age prole
of wages in the data. This approach produces a TFP elasticity of output per worker of 6.6,
which is substantially larger than the elasticity of 1.94 in our baseline calibration and 2.81
when we abstract from sectorial productivity dierences.21 The discrepancy between these
elasticities is not minor: While MS nd that a factor of 20 dierences in output per worker
can be explained with a TFP dierence of 60 percent, our results point to a TFP dierence
of 400 percent. Alternatively, an amplication eect with a TFP elasticity of output of 1.94
in our baseline calibration implies that an annual rate of TFP growth of .92 percent accounts
for the post-war output growth in the United States (about 1.8 percent a year), whereas the
amplication eect found by MS requires a much lower annual rate of technological progress
(.27 percent).
In a closely related study that follows a methodology much dierent from ours, Hendricks
21Manuelli and Seshadri (2005) report a TFP elasticity of output per worker of 9 when both TFP and
demographic factors are allowed to vary across countries. We estimate the elasticity to be 6.6 when demo-
graphic factors are kept constant to U.S. levels using the results in Table 4, page 24. In comparing results
across papers, it should be noted that the TFP dierences in MS apply to the whole economy as opposed to
the Manufacturing (tradable) sector as in our paper.
47(2002) concludes that important TFP dierences are needed to account for the cross-country
data. Hendricks' growth accounting exercise does not rely on a specic functional form for
human capital accumulation, but instead uses data on relative (adjusted by schooling levels)
earnings of immigrants in the United States to directly infer cross-country dierences in
schooling quality. He estimates that for the ve poorest countries in his sample   with
output per capita of 5.8 percent of the US level   a low factor accumulation reduces income
per capita to 47% of the US level. In our paper, the reduction in output per capita accounted
for by a low factor accumulation is 25%   almost twice as big as estimated by Hendricks.
Nonetheless, we think that the conclusions in our paper are consistent with the ndings
of Hendricks. Like Hendricks, we nd that substantial TFP dierences are required to
account for the income disparity in the data. We thus side with Hendricks in concluding
that accounting for the observed cross-country income dierences on the basis of human and
physical capital alone would require implausibly large degrees of self-selection in unobserved
skills among immigrants. Our ndings suggest that TFP is more important than is apparent
in Hendricks' careful analysis since TFP dierences can account for most of the cross-country
variation in average years of schooling and in schooling quality.22 In addition, our paper
emphasizes that human capital accumulation also plays an important role in amplifying
income dierences across countries. We show this by comparing TFP amplication in the
benchmark economy to that in a model with exogenous human capital. We nd that a
20-fold dierence in income between rich and poor countries is generated by a 5-fold TFP
dierence in the tradable sector in our model with human capital, while the model without
human capital requires a stunning 18-fold TFP dierence.
22While the cross-country dierences in schooling quantity and quality are taken as given by Hendricks,
in our paper they are the result of TFP dierences across countries.
486 Conclusions
We developed a quantitative theory of human capital with heterogeneous agents in order to
assess the magnitude of the cross-country dierences in TFP that are needed to explain the
variation in cross-country output per worker. To this end, we calibrate to micro evidence
a rich schooling model in which heterogeneity in schooling is driven by variations in labor-
market returns, schooling tastes, and wealth. In our theory, the parameters governing human
capital production, tastes for schooling, and a random ability process have important im-
plications for a set of cross-sectional statistics: variances and intergenerational correlations
of earnings and schooling, as well as slope coecient and R2 in a Mincer regression. These
restrictions of the theory and U.S. household data are used to pin down the key parameters
driving the quantitative implications of the theory.
To address the ndings of Hsieh and Klenow (2007) that services tend to be cheaper in
poor countries relative to rich countries, we embed our human capital theory in a multi-
sector growth model that allows for sectorial productivity dierences across countries. Our
cross-country simulations allow for relative prices to vary across countries, with services
being relatively cheap in poor economies. Our baseline experiments minimize the role of
human capital in amplifying income dierences across countries by assuming that human
capital investments only require services. Nonetheless, our main nding is that human
capital accumulation strongly amplies TFP dierences across countries: In our preferred
parameterization, the elasticity of output per worker   at PPP prices   with respect to
TFP in the tradable sector is 1.94. This implies that a 5-fold dierence in TFP explains a
20-fold dierence in the output per worker, observed between the 10 percent richest and 10
percent poorest countries in the world. In contrast, without human capital accumulation,
an 18-fold dierence in the TFP of the tradable sector is required to account for the income
dierence between rich and poor countries.
We leave for future work two important extensions of our analysis. First, we plan to
49explore the distributional implications of cross-country dierences in TFP, scal policies and
support for public education. Second, we would like to examine the sensitivity of our results
to modeling heterogeneity in the marginal returns to schooling. This heterogeneity has been
emphasized by a recent micro literature as a potential explanation for why the estimates of
returns to schooling using instrumental variables are bigger than the ones obtained using
ordinary least squares (see Card (2001)). This extension could also be interesting because
the impact of a public-policy reform is driven by the marginal returns of the individuals
aected by the reform and not by the average return in the whole population.
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Model capital stocks are normalized by those in the benchmark economy. Model PPP income is
normalized by the 1990 U.S. GDP at PPP prices. Solid points represent simulated economies;
lines are OLS regressions with log-TFP in manufacturing sector as an explanatory variable. TFP
elasticities (regression coecients on TFP) are indicated in square brackets.














































































Model PPP income is normalized by the 1990 U.S. GDP at PPP prices. Solid points represent
simulated economies; lines are OLS regressions with per-capita income at PPP prices as an ex-
planatory variable. Income elasticities (regression coecients on GDP, PPP) are indicated in
square brackets. Data on prices of non-tradables and education are from Heston, Summers, and
Aten (2002).




































































Ah=As    [2.15]
Baseline [1.40]
Model PPP income is normalized by the 1990 U.S. GDP at PPP prices. Solid points represent simulated
economies; lines are OLS regressions with per-capita income at PPP prices as an explanatory variable. Income
semi-elasticities (regression coecients on GDP, PPP) are indicated in square brackets. Data is from Cohen
and Soto (2007)














































































Data on relative earnings of immigrants across countries is from Hendricks (2002), adjusted by
the level of schooling of the immigrant population. Each curve corresponds to an economy with a
per-capita PPP income relative to that of the U.S. in the percentile indicated. Wealth percentiles
are for populations with similar schooling.
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